SUMMARY

	<u> </u>	25X
	FAR EAST	25X
2.	Philippines now appear willing to sign Japanese peace treaty (page 4).	23/
	The state of the s	
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	NEAR EAST	
5.	Sterner British Middle East policy seen (page 5).	
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7 ,	Yugoslav Government maintains over-optimistic capital investment policy (page 6).	•
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State Department review completed

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FAR EAST

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Philippines no	w appear willin	g to sign Japanes	e peace treaty:	·
tions, " the All	ro ao T g that Japan lac ied Powers sha	ecent revision of ccording to US A he principal mod ks the capability Il recognize that	the Japanese permbassador Cowe ification provide to make ade "the resources of the second sec	nce treaty, n in Manila. s that instead quate repara-
money, goods	noment to leave and services wh	the door open fo nereas the repara	r reparations to	be paid in
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	of "recognizing tions," the All not presently suntil the last numbers, goods	of "recognizing that Japan lactions," the Allied Powers sha not presently sufficient to Cuntil the last moment to leave money, goods and services where the state of the	The Philippines proceed revision of according to US As The principal mod of "recognizing that Japan lacks the capability tions," the Allied Powers shall recognize that not presently sufficient to make complete the complete shall the last moment to leave the door open for the principal mode.	The Philippines probably will accerecent revision of the Japanese peace coording to US Ambassador Cower The principal modification provide of "recognizing that Japan lacks the capability to make adetions," the Allied Powers shall recognize that "the resources on the presently sufficient to make complete reparations." Comment: The Filipinos made structural the last moment to leave the door open for reparations to money, goods and services whereas the reparations envisioned be supplied from Japanese services alone.

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NEAR EAST

Sterner British Middle East policy seen

25X1A	Noting strong parliamentary and public dissatis-
20/(1/	faction with the present situation in the Middle
	East, US Embassy London forecasts a stiffening
	of British policy in dealing with Middle Eastern
	countries. The Conservatives would certainly establish a "tougher" policy
	were they to come to nower and the angeont government under heavy democratic

er" policy hey to come to power, and the present government, under heavy domestic pressure, is displaying impatience over developments there, as manifested in the current British attitude toward Egypt and Iran.

The embassy emphasizes further that the British take seriously their "major responsibility" in the Middle East, but that their appreciation of their need for US military and economic support was one of the most significant aspects of the recent House of Commons Middle East debate. The embassy adds the caution, however, that the British "will listen

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to our advice, but will definitely not want to be displaced or relegated to a secondary role in the Middle East."

<u>Comments</u>: Various indications since the onset of the Iranian crisis have suggested the growing concern of both government circles and informed public opinion over the state of British interests in the Middle East -- at times excluding consideration of other pressing matters.

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EASTERN EUROPE

	- 70;	rugosiav Gvernment mainta	ins over-optimistic capital investment policy:
25X1A			US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade believes that a warning to the Tito government on its over- ambitious capital investment program should be deferred until funds have been made available

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for the US-approved portion of the investment program.

Allen suggests the importance of considering Yugoslav over-optimism regarding its productive capabilities when formulating US policies for financing Yugoslav investment in strategic materials projects and economic aid. He believes the Yugoslav Government tends to minimize its need for production geared for immediate export, expansion of agricultural and consumer goods production, and completion of existing investment projects which can be quickly productive.

Unless these conditions are met, Allen believes that Yugoslav economic plans are likely to become unworkable.

<u>Comment</u>: The Yugoslav economy has consistently suffered from the highly theoretical and overambitious economic schemes of its Marxist planners. This tendency has recently been partially overcome by the advice of US economists and technicians.

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